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Disclosure and engagement principles are included in every corporate 
governance code, reflecting a critical emphasis on communication as a 
vehicle for corporate accountability. These communication principles have 
been a focus of reform worldwide, prompted by shifts in financial market and 
social expectations of corporations. The article examines the disclosure and 
engagement provisions in the Corporate Governance Code in the United 
Kingdom (and the proposed reforms to these provisions) as a case study. The 
proposed initiatives seek to strengthen the voice of employees and enhance 
disclosure around environmental and social concerns. However, this article 
contends that the gains achieved from these reforms may be marginal due to 
structural deficiencies. The incremental disclosure and engagement 
obligations are expected to be flexible and loosely phrased, with a negligible 
probability of significant market consequences or regulatory intervention. 
Moreover, most substantive corporate communication will continue to occur 
at private forums between directors and selected institutional investors. In 
financial markets with these regulatory settings, effective governance 
mechanisms to ensure broad and independent accountability of corporations 
are lacking or weak. Indeed, these legal structures encourage and legitimise 
carefully differentiated private and public communication channels, with the 
public discourse used to present a sparkling company image. Policy makers 
need to re-consider their reliance on private forums to improve governance 
standards and ensure that public communication frameworks are inclusive, 
responsive, probative and enforced. In this way, company law will start to 
meet the growing calls for corporates to act as responsible citizens.          
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I INTRODUCTION 
[C]ontemporary moves toward more socially responsible corporations have 
focused especially on three goals associated with the desire for greater 
‘publicness’ in powerful institutions (corporate and otherwise): more 
transparency via disclosure; increased accountability in decision-making 
processes; and greater voice in those processes for affected persons. These 
usually take the form of governance reform, rather than substantive 
requirements.1  
The Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom (UK) prompted the introduction 
of corporate governance codes around the world and sets the objectives and 
tone of modern corporate disclosure and engagement law and debate.2 This 
seminal report indicates that the key principles of modern corporate governance 
codes are openness, integrity and accountability, and these factors are 
interdependent.3 The primary mechanism identified to achieve these objectives 
is disclosure, and the board of directors is held responsible for reporting quality 
information.4 Similarly the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(OECD Principles) rely on disclosure as the primary mechanism to 1) promote 
effective communication between listed corporations and outsiders, 2) ensure 
corporate boards are held to account, and 3) drive corporate outcomes that 
satisfy public interest objectives including efficient investment and financial 
markets, economic growth, and public trust and confidence in the business 
sector.5  
National corporate governance codes consistently contain disclosure and 
engagement principles and the orthodox model supporting these 
communication recommendations is one of responsive dialogue between 
corporate boards and shareholders.6 Nevertheless, as calls grow for 
corporations to become responsible citizens in society, demands for company 
information and access to corporate executives are increasing and the 
                                                 
1 Donald C Langevoort, ‘Cultures of Compliance’ (2017) 54 American Criminal Law Review 
933, 963. 
2 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1 December 2012) 
[3.5] (‘Cadbury Report’) <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf>.  
3 Ibid [3.5]. 
4 Ibid [4.5].  
5 OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (30 November 2015) OECD iLibrary 
<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/g20-oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance-
2015_9789264236882-en>. 
6 Corporate governance codes are generally encompassed within listing rules that companies 
contractually agree to abide by when they list on an exchange. However, most of these codes 
are supported by legislated provisions and the NYSE Corporate Governance Code contains 
mandatory provisions. 
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commercial and regulatory settings are shifting.7 Recent reforms of corporate 
governance codes (including proposed reforms) typically provide for additions 
to recommended reporting content and a broadening of the engagement 
processes to include key stakeholders, such as employees.8 These features are 
reflected in the proposed reforms to the UK corporate governance code and are 
reviewed in this article as a case study. While some of the specifics of the 
corporate governance framework in the UK reflect local conditions, many of 
the concerns prompting the reform agenda are replicated in other jurisdictions. 
The proposed reforms are relevant in Australia because governance 
developments in the UK are an important influence on regulation here.9 Most 
of the principles laid down in the Cadbury Report are reflected in the Australian 
corporate governance code10 and issues concerning the environmental and 
social responsibilities of Australian companies and the rights and remedies of 
stakeholders are ongoing and highly contested.11  
The primary purpose of corporate governance is ‘to help build an environment 
of trust, transparency and accountability necessary for fostering long term 
investment, financial stability and business integrity, thereby supporting 
                                                 
7 See, eg, Jeroen Veldman, Filip Gregor and Paige Morrow, ‘Corporate Governance for a 
Changing World: Report of a Global Roundtable Series’ Frank Bold and Cass Business School 
18, 52 <http://www.purposeofcorporation.org/corporate-governance-for-a-changing-world_ 
report.pdf>. Corporate leaders who participated in a series of global forums suggested that ‘the 
role of corporate governance is not only to protect the corporation but to ensure that a 
corporation is able to create value for society at large.’ See also United Nations Global 
Compact-Accenture Strategy CEO Study <https://www.accenture.com/au-en/insight-un-
global-compact-ceo-study>. For the purposes of this article, the terms corporate responsibility, 
corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship are treated as interchangeable.  
8 See, eg, Gill North, ‘Corporate Management and Reporting of Environmental and Social 
Matters in New Zealand: The Rules, Evidence and Analysis’ (2018) 23 New Zealand Business 
Law Quarterly 240; Gill North, ‘Corporate Management and Communication of Environmental 
and Social Risks in Australia: Pressures Are Mounting’ (2018) Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law forthcoming). 
9 Australian Institute of Company Directors, ‘UK Governance Reforms’ (20 October 2017) 
<https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/advocacy/governance-leadership-centre/external-envir 
onment/uk-governance-reforms>.    
10 ASX Corporate Governance Council, ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (3rd ed, 2014) Australian Stock Exchange <https://www.asx.com.au/ 
regulation/compliance/compliance-downloads.htm>.    
11 This article does not seek to provide comparative analysis with the Australian position. Instead, 
the governance rules in Australia regarding corporate disclosure and engagement on 
environmental and social matters are discussed in Gill North, ‘Corporate Management and 
Communication of Environmental and Social Risks in Australia’, above n 8. See also 
Governance Institute of Australia, ‘Shareholder Primacy: Is There a Need for Change’ 
(Discussion Paper, 2014); Noel Hutley and Sebastian Hartford-Davis, The Centre for Policy 
Development and the Future Business Council, ‘Climate Change and Directors’ Duties’ 
(Memorandum of Opinion, 7 October 2016).    
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stronger growth and more inclusive societies’.12 While these aims are laudable, 
this article suggests the long-term gains resulting from recent corporate 
governance reforms may be limited due to structural deficiencies. The most 
significant structural concerns are: first, an increasing reliance by company 
boards on non-public forms of disclosure and engagement; second, market and 
legal governance processes that fail to address significant conflicts of interest; 
and, third, negligible market and legal consequences when corporate disclosure 
and engagement standards and practices are inadequate. To illustrate these 
structural issues, the article examines the disclosure and engagement provisions 
in the corporate governance code in the UK13 and the proposed reforms.   
In the UK and elsewhere, many listed company boards use private meetings 
with institutional participants as their main channel of communication,14 and 
policy makers continue to encourage these meetings on the assumption that 
adopting this form of dialogue is the best way to optimise corporate governance 
standards.15 The article argues that advocates of these private corporate 
communication and governance models are failing to holistically consider the 
inherent risks and long term adverse effects on corporations, financial markets, 
and nations. Many corporations use private forums to convey necessary 
information to selected institutional participants for procedural, security 
valuation, and capital raising purposes. Whilst this communication is beneficial 
for those involved, these carefully tiered structures can result in low quality 
public disclosures and highly restricted opportunities for other investors and 
stakeholders to engage with the board (either face-to-face or virtually). In the 
UK, and in most other major jurisdictions, the corporate governance code 
principles are supported by statutory and listing rule disclosure and engagement 
requirements. But when these broader regulatory frameworks allow (and even 
encourage) use of private forums for comprehensive dialogue with a small pool 
of investors, the lines between voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
environments become indistinct, raising serious questions concerning the 
purpose, legitimacy, and efficacy of the legal structures.  
The second Part of the article summarises the rationales for inclusion of 
disclosure and engagement provisions in corporate governance codes. Part III 
considers the operation of corporate disclosure and engagement governance 
                                                 
12 OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance, above n 5, 7.   
13 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code (April 2016) 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-
governance-code>. 
14 See, eg, Steve Johnson, ‘FSA Crackdown on Cash for CEO Access’, Financial Times (online), 
5 March 2013 <https://www.ft.com/content/084a4bdc-84db-11e2-891d-00144feabdc0>. 
15 Financial Reporting Council, above n 13, 22. 
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structures. Part IV narrows the geographical focus and discusses the disclosure 
and engagement provisions in the Corporate Governance Code in the UK (UK 
Code). Part V explores the efficacy of the UK company disclosure and 
engagement governance frameworks. The article highlights the high levels of 
discretion in the regulation concerning the form, scope, and recipients of 
company disclosures and engagement; the absence of likely significant market 
or regulatory interventions; and the continued policy encouragement of, and 
emphasis on, private communication channels. The article concludes that the 
disclosure and engagement obligations in the corporate governance framework 
in the UK are weak and fail to adequately promote the objectives of 
transparency, accountability, trust, inclusiveness and sustainability.16  
II CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES: RATIONALES FOR 
INCLUSION OF DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLES 
The legal and governance architectures of companies registered under 
incorporation statutes are built on the assumption that boards are accountable 
and will provide high quality information to enable shareholders (and to a lesser 
extent others) to make well informed decisions and engage with the company 
regarding its conduct and performance.17 For example, paragraph 3.2 of the 
Cadbury Report indicates that  
Openness on the part of companies, within the limits set by their competitive 
position, is the basis for the confidence which needs to exist between business 
and all those who have a stake in its success. An open approach to the 
disclosure of information contributes to the efficient working of the market 
economy, prompts boards to take effective action and allows shareholders 
and others to scrutinise companies more thoroughly.         
                                                 
16 Corporate sustainability is defined by the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) as starting 
with a company’s value system and a principled approach to doing business, wherever a 
company has a presence. The UNGC suggests the rationale for adopting a corporate culture of 
integrity and business strategies, policies and procedures that satisfy minimum standards in the 
areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption is to set the stage for long-term 
success: UNGC, ‘The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact’ <https://www. 
unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles>. The UNGC is the most prominent 
corporate sustainability initiative, with 9000 companies and 4000 non-businesses signatories.        
17 For an historical outline, see Gill North, ‘Public Company Communication, Engagement and 
Accountability: Where Are We and Where Should We Be Heading?’ (2013) 31 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 167. See also New York Stock Exchange, NYSE: Corporate 
Governance Guide vi; The New York Stock Exchange proudly states that it has required 
companies to provide financial statements and annual reports to shareholders since the 1890s.  
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The importance of effective company reporting is highlighted repeatedly 
throughout the Cadbury Report. Paragraph 4.48 describes transparency and 
information as the lifeblood of financial markets, and paragraph 4.50 confirms 
the need for company boards to present a balanced, understandable and 
coherent narrative within reports and disclosures.  
Similar themes are highlighted in the OECD Principles, which contain the 
international standards for modern corporate governance.18 The OECD 
Principles confirm that disclosure obligations operate as a tool to influence the 
behaviour of companies, protect investors, attract capital, and maintain 
confidence in capital markets.19 These obligations are deemed necessary 
because instances of poor and inadequate disclosure commonly reflect 
unethical behaviour and a lack of integrity, and can result in undue costs to the 
relevant companies, their shareholders, and the broader economy.20 The OECD 
Principles acknowledge that effective consultation with the public is an 
essential element of a successful corporate governance framework.21 
Within legal scholarly circles, debates concerning the rationales and benefits of 
corporate disclosure regimes still rage.22 In the meantime, the world has moved 
on and most countries have adopted corporate disclosure regimes that include 
periodic reporting and continuous disclosure obligations.23 Many scholars 
support mandatory company disclosure on a single basis such as market 
efficiency or good governance, while not accepting other rationales such as 
market fairness or sustainability.24 Other commentators suggest that the 
rationales underpinning existing disclosure regimes are multifaceted and 
                                                 
18 OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance, above n 5.   
19 Ibid 38. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid 13. 
22 For discussion on the scholarly literature on mandatory company reporting regimes, see Gill 
North, ‘Timely Public Disclosure of Company Information: A Likely Precondition for Optimal 
Long-Term Corporate and National Outcomes’ (2014) 32 Company and Securities Law Journal 
560. 
23 Gill North, Effective Company Disclosure in the Digital Age (Kluwer Law International, 2015). 
This book provides an overview of the periodic reporting and continuous disclosure regimes in 
the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and 
Singapore. 
24 See, eg, Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code (September 2012) 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code>. The UK Stewardship Code was 
introduced in 2010 on a comply or explain basis.  
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interconnected, and difficult to meaningfully dissect.25 As the Institute of 
Directors in New Zealand (the Institute) notes:  
[g]ood corporate reporting supports good corporate governance and the 
underlying principles of accountability, transparency, probity and long-term 
business sustainability. Thoughtful reporting focused on performance also 
promotes shareholder and stakeholder confidence and trust.26 
Although company disclosure regimes are limited in effect and not a panacea 
to solve every issue arising in financial markets, these regimes provide essential 
foundational support within commercial and regulatory structures and should 
be designed and supervised to work optimally.  
III HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND 
ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES OPERATE 
Most corporate governance codes around the world require listed companies to 
fully comply with the code recommendations or explain why they have not 
done so (referred to as a ‘comply or explain’ approach).27 The comply-or-
explain approach is intended to provide policy makers and financial market 
participants with sufficient flexibility to develop tailored rules, structures and 
practices that are suitable for the circumstances of individual corporations.28 
National corporate governance codes comprise a hierarchy of principles with 
markedly varying degrees of specificity. Competitive pressures for companies 
to provide a ‘clean bill of health’ have resulted in a predominant focus on the 
more specific code principles. For example, principles in corporate governance 
codes that have prompted significant change internationally include the 
principle, expressed in recommendations or requirements, that a majority of 
independent directors should be maintained, and that audit and compensation 
committees should be established. These principles are highly prescriptive, and 
companies have little discretion when indicating their compliance or otherwise. 
                                                 
25 See, eg, Cadbury Report, above n 2, [3.5]; International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (June 2010) 3; North, above 
n 22, 9–42. The stated rationales for company reporting regimes are typically a blend of market 
fairness, market efficiency, investor protection, and corporate governance.  
26 Institute of Directors (NZ), ‘Response to NZX Review of Corporate Governance Reporting 
Requirements’ (25 February 2016) 1, <https://www.iod.org.nz/Portals/0/Governance% 
20resources/IoD%20submision%20to%20NZX%20Feb%202016.pdf>. There is no accepted 
definition of ‘stakeholders’. For the purposes of this chapter, the term applies to groups or 
individuals that contribute to, or are influenced or impacted by, a company’s activities. 
27 Financial Reporting Council, above n 13, 4.  
28 Ibid; OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance, above n 8, 11. 
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Given the strictness of these principles, most listed companies have altered their 
board arrangements to comply with them, albeit that a minority of companies 
(usually smaller companies) prefer to explain their non-compliance. In contrast, 
the disclosure and engagement principles within the same governance codes are 
broad and open to interpretation. Indeed, some companies appear to interpret 
these principles as satisfied by the simple release of generic policy statements.  
The publishing of corporate governance statements is a form of market 
transparency. Fung, Graham and Weil describe a transparency program as a 
continuous ‘action cycle’29 that is initiated when new information is disclosed. 
Users must then comprehend this information and respond to the discloser or 
change their behaviour based on the information disclosed. Finally, the 
discloser must react appropriately to the user responses or changed behaviour. 
Importantly, the success of a transparency program requires fulfilment of each 
stage of the action cycle. Within the corporate governance context, the 
transparency program in operation is based on a series of assumptions. First, it 
is assumed that a company will provide a candid and comprehensive 
governance statement that indicates whether it has fully complied with each of 
the principles, and if not, why not. Second, it is assumed that these statements 
are read and understood by shareholders (and possibly others). Third, it is 
assumed that investors (and others) will actively respond by adjusting the 
company’s valuation or their investment or trading parameters, by changing 
their conduct, or by directly engaging with the company. Finally, it is assumed 
that the company will constructively respond to the outsiders’ engagement and 
or conduct and adjust its behaviour in relation to the issues raised. Each of these 
assumptions can be challenged. For example, some commentators argue that 
corporate governance statements do not impact investment decisions because 
investors do not assess these statements and do not engage with companies 
about their governance practices. Keay notes that ‘research suggests that 
investors do not monitor sufficiently and do not generally bother to engage in 
any assessment of what companies have done or not done’.30 Keay’s argument 
is supported by empirical studies that find investor evaluations of governance 
statements are often nonchalant or muted, particularly while a company’s 
financial performance remains strong.31 These study findings raise important 
                                                 
29 See Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils & Promise of 
Transparency (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
30 Andrew Keay, ‘Comply or Explain: In Need of Greater Regulatory Oversight’ (2014) 34 Legal 
Studies 279, 293.  
31 Ruth Aguilera and Alvaro Cuervo-Cazzura, ‘Codes of Good Governance’ (2009) 17 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 376, 383. See also Iain MacNeil and Xiao Li, ‘“Comply 
or Explain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code’ (2006) 14 
Corporate Governance International Review 486; Christian Andres and Erik Theissen, ‘Setting 
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issues concerning the intended or desired responses from investors to specific 
items within corporate governance statements and the governance conduct of 
businesses more broadly, as well as the motivations driving these responses.  
The author has been unable to locate any examples internationally of a company 
acknowledging partial or full non-compliance with any disclosure or 
engagement code principle or provision in its governance statement.32 
Regardless, one needs to consider the likely response of investors to instances 
of non-compliance with a disclosure or engagement provision or to an 
inadequate explanation of the non-compliance. Investor responses to disclosure 
and engagement governance concerns would be likely to vary greatly 
depending on their capacity to gain private access to the relevant directors and 
senior managers. Investors and stakeholders with direct access to boards and 
executives can discuss matters in depth with the corporation and are therefore 
relatively less concerned by public disclosure and engagement deficiencies than 
other participants. Indeed, when acting on an economically rational basis, these 
participants might prefer public reporting of a lower standard to enable them to 
benefit commercially from the receipt of higher value private information.33 It 
is the other shareholders (and stakeholders) without private access to corporate 
management that most require effective public disclosure and engagement 
structures, including reasonable opportunities for dialogue with company 
leadership, regular monitoring of the content and timing of company 
disclosures, and enforcement of the relevant law when appropriate.34 It is also  
the interests and rights of these shareholders and stakeholders that remain most 
contentious, and this is reflected in corporate governance debates worldwide.   
                                                 
a Fox to Keep the Geese –— Does the Comply-or-Explain Principle Work?’ (2008) 14 Journal 
of Corporate Finance 289. 
32 Notably, this claim is limited to corporate governance code principles or provisions governing 
disclosure or engagement matters. The author would welcome any contrary examples.  
33 The larger the gaps between the quality of information provided privately and publicly, and 
the longer the timeframe between its release privately and publicly, the higher its potential 
commercial value. 
34 Stakeholder communities, such as employees and suppliers, may have considerable perceived 
or actual negotiation strength with a company, given their critical role in business operations. 
Other groups, such as communities impacted by environmental issues and breaches of human 
rights, may have to rely on public good arguments or moral persuasion. 
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IV DISCLOSURE AND ENGAGEMENT PROVISIONS IN THE 
UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
A Disclosure and Engagement Provisions in the UK 
Code 
The Corporate Governance Code in the UK applies to listed corporations and 
aims to encourage boards to be effective, accountable, transparent in their 
decision making and communications and focused on the long-term success of 
the company.35 The UK Code is overseen by the UK Financial Reporting 
Council which has a stated mission to promote transparency and integrity in 
business.36 Importantly, the heading of Section C of the UK Code is 
‘accountability’. Principle C.1 states that ‘the board should present a fair, 
balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and 
prospects’.37 Code provision C.1.1.1 confirms that annual reports are necessary 
‘for shareholders to assess the company’s position and performance’, meaning 
that the intended audience of annual reports is limited to shareholders. The 
supporting principles within section C indicate that the board’s disclosure 
responsibilities extend to all public reports and information required under 
legislation, ensuring that the linkages between the Code principles relating to 
disclosure and the broader company disclosure framework are acknowledged.38 
The statutory obligations under the Companies Act 2006 (UK) (‘Companies 
Act’) require most companies to provide half year and annual reports, and listed 
companies must also comply with continuous disclosure rules and the London 
Stock Exchange disclosure listing rules.39  
Code provision C.1.2 states that directors should explain the company’s 
business model (that is, how it generates or preserves value over the longer 
term) and the strategy for delivering its objectives. Inclusion of this provision 
within the UK Code is commendable, albeit that it reiterates the obligations in 
                                                 
35 Financial Reporting Council, above n 13, 1. 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 16.  
38 These broader disclosure frameworks include principle and rule-based law. As Black notes, it 
is ‘hard to classify any one regulatory regime as being either entirely rules based or entirely 
principle based; the better question is what is, and should be, the relative roles of each: Julia 
Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles-Based Regulation’ (London School of Economics 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 17/2010) 24 subsequently included in Kern 
Alexander and Niamh Moloney (eds), Law Reform and Financial Markets (Edward Elgar, 
2011). See also Julia Black, ‘The Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation’ (2009) 
3 Capital Markets Law Journal 425.      
39 For a brief overview, see North, above n 22, 131–4. 
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Ch 4A of the Companies Act40 that are discussed in Part VC of this article. 
Provision C.1.2 reflects the increasing market demands globally for companies 
to publicly explain their long-term strategies and performance.   
Principle E.1 of the UK Code states that it is the board’s responsibility to ensure 
that satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place.41 This principle repeats 
the traditional focus on board communication with shareholders. Code 
Provision E.1.1. indicates that the Chairman should discuss governance and 
strategy with major shareholders and that non-executive directors should be 
encouraged to attend these meetings.42 Encouragement of private dialogue 
between company boards and major shareholders is a consistent theme in 
corporate policy debates in the UK, as evidenced in Code Provision E.1.1 and 
the Kay Review of Equity Markets,43 and, to a lesser extent, the UK 
Stewardship Code.44 While private briefings are common in other jurisdictions, 
their use is encouraged more openly in the UK than in other countries.  
B Disclosure and Engagement Provisions in Practice 
Policy makers and scholars commonly assume that corporate governance and 
disclosure models which rely on private meetings with core investors lead to 
superior governance and corporate outcomes.45 However, these assumptions 
are based on incomplete evidence and lack clear empirical support. Private 
meetings between corporate directors and institutional participants may be used 
to discuss important governance issues and these discussions may result in 
                                                 
40 Amended by adoption of the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013. 
41 Financial Reporting Council, above n 13, 22. 
42 Ibid.  
43 See, eg, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Interim 
Report (February 2012); The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision 
Making: Final Report (July 2012) <http://www.ecgi.org/conferences/eu_actionplan2013/ 
documents/kay_review_final_report.pdf>. See also Gill North, ‘Listed Company Disclosure 
and Financial Market Transparency: Is This a Battle Worth Fighting or Merely Policy and 
Regulatory Mantra?’ (2014) 6 Journal of Business Law 486. North argues that the Kay Review 
reports assume a privileged role for financial intermediaries, and in doing so, discount the role, 
rights and needs of direct investors.  
44 See, eg, Tomorrow’s Company, Better Stewardship: An Agenda for Concerted Action (January 
2018) <https://tomorrowscompany.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Better-Stewardship-An-
agenda-for-concerted-action_-25Jan2018.pdf>. 
45 See Eugene Soltes, ‘Private Interaction Between Firm Management and Sell-side Analysts’ 
(2014) 52 Journal of Accounting Research 245; Steve Johnson, above n 14. Policy makers and 
scholars often rely on exaggerated and unsubstantiated caricatures of institutional and non-
institutional investors to substantiate these claims. But see Alastair Lawrence, ‘Individual 
Investors and Financial Disclosure’ (2013) 56 Journal of Accounting and Economics 130. 
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positive change. For instance, an institutional investor may demand or negotiate 
specific governance improvements at a corporation and patiently wait for the 
desired changes to be reflected in the security price. In any event, models that 
unduly emphasise the governance (or stewardship) role of institutional 
investors do not provide a balanced or holistic picture of the processes required 
to enhance corporate governance and accountability in financial markets. 
Institutional investors often seek direct access to corporate executives to obtain 
ongoing information, updates and signals from corporations, and are 
powerfully motivated to do so because informational or timing advantages in 
financial markets are valuable. This value is greatest when information is 
obtained by the institutional investor in advance of other participants, and this 
results in trading gains (or reduced losses) without the need for diligent and 
sophisticated analysis. All other things being equal, investors or traders who 
obtain superior or timelier information from companies than other participants 
will profit to the detriment of those who are less informed.46  
Concerns regarding corporate communication centred on private meetings 
remain largely unaired.47 Instead, the operation and outcomes of these private 
forums remain shrouded in secrecy and the players’ sense of entitlement. 
Corporate communication structures are inherently political and can have a 
profound impact on people’s reputation, professional standing, and wealth. The 
way in which these frameworks operate determines or influences: the reputation 
and remuneration of company directors and executives; the returns and 
competitiveness of asset managers, brokers, and other financial market service 
providers; the interests of corporate advisers such as lawyers, accountants, 
auditors and consultants; the public face of companies; and outcomes for other 
shareholders and persons affected by corporate activity.48  
Demand from institutional investors for private contacts with company 
executives is intense and the battles for the best access to senior executives span 
the full spectrum of participants. The associated power games are typically won 
by those with perceived or actual wealth and political influence. Hence, the 
financial institutions that control the largest funds or trading portfolios hold 
most sway given their voting power and greater capacity to pay or manoeuvre 
for private access. The Financial Times in the UK reported in 2013 that asset 
                                                 
46 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading (2000).    
47 See Gill North, ‘Closed and Private Company Briefings: Justifiable or Unfair?’ (2008) 26 
Company and Securities Law Journal 501.   
48 See, eg, Anil Gürtürk and Rüdiger Hahn, ‘An Empirical Assessment of Assurance Statements 
in Sustainability Reports: Smoke Screens or Enlightening Information?’ (2016) 136 Journal of 
Cleaner Production 30.       
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managers were paying large sums of money to brokers and investment bankers 
to arrange meetings with chief executive officers. An anonymous senior figure 
from a large UK asset manager confirmed that payments for corporate access 
were commonplace and that this was how things have always operated.49 While 
asset managers and others may consider payments for executive access as 
‘normal’,50 such conduct does not create an environment that is likely to 
enhance corporate governance standards and performance. Analysis by the 
Financial Services Authority confirmed that some large asset managers were 
making payments for executive access using client commissions. While this 
practice is now banned in the UK,51 this ban relates only to payments for access 
to executives and does not prohibit private meetings per se.  
The UK Code does not outline the scope or specificity of matters encompassed 
within the areas of governance and strategy that are appropriate for discussion 
at private meetings with core investors. Nor does the UK Code define the type 
of governance and strategic content that is considered materially price sensitive 
and therefore required to be disclosed publicly under the continuous disclosure 
regimes rather than in private forums. The lack of detail on these issues is 
problematic. Policy makers and others seem to assume that only core 
institutional participants are interested in, and require, detailed ongoing 
knowledge about a company’s strategy and corporate governance processes. 
Under the present disclosure rules, other investors and stakeholders are left to 
make decisions based on summaries provided in annual reports once a year, as 
discussed more fully in Part VC.  
The differences in the scale and quality of the information sets provided by 
companies privately and publicly are substantial, although difficult to explain 
or demonstrate to people outside of the system. For readers who are teachers, 
an imperfect analogy may assist. Assume your company law class is split 
equally into two groups of students based on whether they have brown or blue 
eyes. The information you give the students with brown eyes is limited to two 
sets of summary information comprising two to four pages; one is provided half 
way through the unit and the other at the end of the unit (equivalent to the half 
year and full year reports).52 This group of students is not permitted to meet 
with you or ask questions during the unit duration but can read 4 or 5 short 
updates from the unit website during this period (equivalent to continuous 
                                                 
49 Johnson, above n 14.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 The number of pages in company annual reports may be in the hundreds but the important 
commentary (or management discussion and analysis) within these reports is often limited to 
between two and four pages.    
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disclosures).53 Your blue-eyed students receive the same summary commentary 
and short updates as the other group, but are also able to meet with you to 
discuss the unit content and ask questions (either in your office or by phone) 
once every two weeks for two hours. In addition, these students are permitted 
to provide you with draft assignment and exam papers and receive personalised 
feedback. Ask yourself whether you would expect similar unit results from 
these two cohorts and whether investors under these conditions can trade on an 
equitable basis.    
C Proposed Reforms to the Corporate Governance 
Code in the United Kingdom 
The UK Government has confirmed plans to reform the UK Code and has 
indicated that there was strong support for action to strengthen the stakeholder 
voice during the submission and consultation processes, and that many 
participants thought companies should do more to reflect their responsibilities 
to employees, customers and wider society.54 The Government has accepted 
three reform proposals to address these concerns: 1) the enactment of legislation 
requiring all companies (public and private) of a significant size to explain how 
their directors comply with the requirements of section 172 of the Companies 
Act; 2) the introduction of a new UK Code principle ‘establishing the 
importance of strengthening the voice of employees and other non-shareholder 
interests at board level as an important component of running a sustainable 
business’ and; 3) the encouragement of industry initiatives and guidance 
regarding corporate engagement with employees and other stakeholders.55 The 
nature and structure of section 172 are examined in Part VB. 
The final UK Code reforms are still to be determined. Key issues that are still 
under consideration include the levels of discretion that companies will be 
given to determine the nature, form and scope of the explanations regarding 
                                                 
53 While listed companies typically release more than four or five continuous disclosures during 
a year, in most cases only a minority of these releases contain substantive and financially 
material information.  
54 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), ‘Corporate Governance 
Reform: The Government Response to the Green Paper Consultation’ (August 2017) [2.3], 
Annex B <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640470/ 
corporate-governance-reform-government-response.pdf>. See also BEIS, Corporate 
Governance Reform Green Paper (November 2016) <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/584013/corporate-governance-reform-green-paper.pdf>.   
55 See ‘Corporate Governance Reform: The Government Response to the Green Paper 
Consultation’, above n 54, 4. There was no agreement from the initial respondents on the best 
reform options: at [2.5]–[2.24]. 
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their compliance with section 172 and the degree and form of engagement with 
stakeholders who are not shareholders. The UK Government envisages that 
companies will be required to explain ‘how key stakeholders have been 
identified, how their views have been sought, why the company’s engagement 
mechanisms were considered appropriate, and how the information obtained 
from them influenced the board’s decision making.’56 Companies could also be 
required to adopt specific stakeholder-related objectives, with key performance 
indicators and progress updates. More importantly, companies may be required 
to include a stakeholder representative on the board, or establish stakeholder 
advisory panels, or to provide a designated non-executive director to represent 
and give voice to key stakeholder groups.57 Consultations are underway, and 
the general counsel of the leading UK companies have been asked to provide 
advice and guidance on the practical interpretation of the director duties under 
section 172.58 
V ARE THE CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND ENGAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORKS IN THE UK ACHIEVING THEIR 
OBJECTIVES?  
A Overview 
The proposed reforms in the UK rely heavily on disclosure mechanisms, 
including a strategic report that must be published by most companies within 
the annual report and publicly released no later than four months after a 
company’s financial year end.59 Section 414C(1) states that the ‘purpose of the 
strategic report is to inform members of the company and help them assess how 
the directors have performed their duty under section 172 (duty to promote the 
success of the company)’. As the purpose of the strategic reports is to allow 
shareholders to assess the extent and manner of a company’s compliance with 
section 172, it is important to explore the nature and structure of this director 
duty before considering the disclosure requirements. 
                                                 
56 See, eg, Shearman, Shearman and Sterling, UK Corporate Governance Reform — The 
Government’s Final Proposals (1 September 2017) Perspectives <https://www.shearman. 
com/perspectives/2017/09/uk-corporate-governance-reform>.   
57 ‘Corporate Governance Reform: The Government Response to the Green Paper Consultation’ 
above n 54, 4–5.  
58 Ibid 4.  
59 Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 414A. 
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B The Section 172 Duty 
Section 172 of the Companies Act came into force on 1 October 2007 and 
provides that: 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit 
of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards 
of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
The primary duty of directors under this section is therefore to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole, and the 
factors listed within section 172(1)(a)-(f) need only be considered in light of 
this overarching duty.60 The structure of section 172 raises important issues that 
impact on the scope and credibility of the proposed reforms.  
First, what does acting in the interests of the shareholders as a whole mean? 
Lord Goldsmith indicated in the UK Parliament that the section 172 duty  
is to promote the success for the benefit of the members as a whole — that is, 
for the members as a collective body — not only to benefit the majority 
shareholders, or any particular shareholder or section of shareholders, still 
less the interests of directors who might happen to be shareholders 
themselves.61  
                                                 
60 Andrew Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United 
Kingdom’s “Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach”’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 577, 
592, 597.       
61 Lords Grand Committee, 6 February 2006, column GC256.  
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This statement makes clear that companies should not act solely in the interests 
of majority shareholders but does not explain how the board should balance the 
interests of majority and minority shareholders when these interests diverge.62 
All shareholders in a company benefit when a company’s overall valuation 
increases, and this is reflected in the share price. However, when shareholders 
buy or sell a company’s securities, the required balancing is more complex. If 
one assumes that the primary goal of investors is to maximise their financial 
returns, one shareholder or class of shareholders can do this at the expense of 
others. As discussed, demands from institutional investors for private briefings 
with corporate leaders are intense because these participants hope these 
briefings will give them an informational advantage vis-à-vis other market 
participants. Secondary trading of existing company securities is a zero-sum 
game and when one side of a trade gains on a trade, the counterparty loses to 
the same extent. Thus, assuming all other factors are equal, the private corporate 
communication structures operate in favour of the participants who have been 
given the best access and information, to the detriment of other shareholders. 
‘Fairness between shareholders’ is one of the specified factors that directors 
must have regard to under section 172. When considering fairness issues across 
the shareholder base, though, the primary duty of directors is to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole. To show 
compliance with this duty, directors could legitimately argue that the private 
communication structures are in the interests of ‘shareholders as a whole’, even 
when they allow shareholders with superior access to company managers and 
information to profit at the expense of those with poorer quality information 
and less regular or no direct access to managers.  
The UK regulatory structure includes regimes that encourage continuous 
disclosure and penalise insider trading and that are intended to mitigate the 
potential shifts in wealth that flow to traders with ‘inside’ information.63 In 
order to comply with these regimes, companies with well-established private 
communication structures typically argue that the information conveyed 
                                                 
62 See Keay, above n 60, 601.       
63 A company listed in the UK is subject to the continuing obligations imposed by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and the London Stock Exchange. The key continuing obligations 
imposed by the FCA can be found in the Listing Rules and the Disclosure Guidance and 
Transparency Rules (DTRs). See, especially, Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, DTR 
2.2.1, DTR 2.5.1. Article 8 of the Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation 596/2014) prohibits 
insider trading ‘where a person possesses inside information and uses that information by 
acquiring or disposing of, for its own account or for the account of a third party, directly or 
indirectly, financial instruments to which that information relates’. Under the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 (UK), it is a criminal offence to deal in securities on the basis of inside information, 
which is information that is not yet publicly known and which would affect the price of the 
securities if it were made public. 
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privately is not materially price sensitive and merely provides an expanded 
explanation of the publicly disclosed content. The validity of these arguments 
is difficult to assess since most of the detailed communication between 
corporations and the market occurs behind closed doors and since these 
exchanges are not independently monitored and enforced.   
Based on her global experience as a financial analyst, the author suggests that 
the true costs of private corporate communication structures to corporations, 
shareholders, other stakeholders, and the broader community are difficult to 
overstate. These costs include the time of the senior executives attending and 
involved in these briefings, ongoing redistributions of trading wealth to the 
largest investment entities, and the more holistic and significant costs that arise 
when the governance and public communication structures of individual 
corporations are poor. When large corporate collapses and/or significant market 
or financial crises occur, major communication failures and/or conflicts of 
interest are generally revealed. In the wake of these catastrophic events, policy 
makers and others often highlight the consequences and costs of poor 
governance and corporate and financial market opacity. For instance, both the 
UK’s Treasury Select Committee and the OECD Steering Group on Corporate 
Governance formed the view that weak corporate governance was a major 
cause of the financial crisis post 2009.64 However, the full cost of corporate and 
financial market opacity extends well beyond the consequences of these major 
events. As the OECD notes, poor and inadequate corporate disclosure 
commonly reflects unethical behaviour and a lack of business integrity.65 
Similarly, as Jay Clayton, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the United States observed recently, ‘[l]ooking back at 
enforcement actions, a common theme emerges — where opacity exists, bad 
behaviour tends to follow’.66 Put simply, corporate and financial environments 
that are permitted to operate in the shadows without robust governance and 
                                                 
64 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance 
and Pay in the City’ (London, Stationery Office, 2009) and quoted in M Arden, ‘Regulating the 
Conduct of Directors’ (2010) 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1, 1. 
65 These private communication structures are further undermined by policy settings that allow 
institutional investors to own, operate and use dark trading venues that operate in the shadows 
of major securities exchanges. See Michael Lewis, Flashboys: A Wall Street Revolt 
(W W Norton, 2015). See also Gill North and Ross Buckley, ‘A Financial Transaction Tax: 
Inefficient or Needed Systemic Reform?’ (2012) 43 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
745.    
66 Jay Clayton, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman, ‘Governance and Transparency 
at the Commission and in Our Markets’ (Remarks at the Practising Law Institute 49th Annual 
Institute on Securities Regulation, New York, 8 November 2017).  
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disclosure structures tend to become toxic and rarely lead to optimal corporate 
or national outcomes. 
When corporate leadership or institutional investors behave badly, or the 
performance of corporations is suboptimal because of poor governance, a large 
share of the resulting costs is typically borne by stakeholders and the broader 
community. This pattern raises a second major issue with section 172, namely 
how should company boards in the UK approach situations where the interests 
of shareholders conflict with the interests of other stakeholders?67 In many 
circumstances, the interests of stakeholders will be aligned with the interests of 
shareholders and the corporation as an entity (especially over the long term), 
while at other times these interests will diverge. In its current form, section 172 
explicitly encourages boards to ignore or trade off the factors in section 
172(1)(a)-(f) either partially or fully, when this is necessary to maximise 
shareholder benefits, even if this results in detrimental impacts on other 
stakeholders or the environment.68 Importantly, the Company Law Review 
Steering Group that recommended the introduction of section 172 considered 
policy options that would have required directors to consider the interests of 
stakeholders alongside the benefits to shareholders, but specifically rejected 
these avenues.69      
A third major structural issue that has received scarce attention in scholarly 
literature concerns the timeframe of business decision making under section 
172. Many policy makers and scholars highlight concerns relating to the short-
term focus of many businesses and an undue preoccupation by listed 
corporations with their short-term share price.70 These concerns are highlighted 
in the UK Code and corporate governance reform documents.71 Yet ‘long term 
consequences’ are listed as a secondary factor in section 172, so directors are 
potentially encouraged to prioritise short term returns to shareholders, even 
                                                 
67 See also Keay, above n 60, 599.       
68 The equivalent director duties in other jurisdictions, such as s 181 of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) in Australia, do not explicitly list the interests of other stakeholders and impacts on 
the environment as secondary factors. Nonetheless, many scholars and others argue that most, 
if not all, corporate boards primarily focus on shareholder returns when making business 
decisions, even when this requires compromises in relation to other factors, such as those listed 
in s 172.   
69 See Company Law Review Steering Group, Department of Trade and Industry, Modern 
Company Law for A Competitive Environment: The Strategic Framework (1999) 37–8. See also 
Keay, above n 60, 592.          
70 See, eg, Andrew Keay, ‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and 
Sustainability Model’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 663. 
71 See, eg, Financial Reporting Council, above n 13, s C.1.2. 
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when this is not in the long-term interests of the corporation and is not 
economically, environmentally and socially sustainable.  
Section 172 is often referred to as embodying an ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’ approach, but the extent to which the duty to preference shareholders is 
in fact ‘enlightened’ remains highly contentious.72 For example, a report on the 
social responsibility of corporations by the Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee in Australia concluded that  
A non-exhaustive catalogue of interests to be taken into account serves little 
useful purpose for directors and affords them no guidance on how various 
interests are to be weighed, prioritised and reconciled ... The Committee 
considers that … to require or permit directors to have regard to certain 
matters or the interests of certain classes of stakeholders, could in fact be 
counterproductive. There is a real danger that such a provision would blur 
rather than clarify the purpose that directors are to serve. In so doing, it could 
make directors less accountable to shareholders without significantly 
enhancing the rights of other parties.73 
The two-tiered structure of section 172 is deeply misguided and sends the 
wrong message to corporate boards (and outsiders) in the current environment. 
The duty does not assist boards to make carefully calibrated business decisions 
with a long-term view. Instead, it arguably encourages directors to prioritise 
short term returns to investors even when this involves deeply compromised 
outcomes for other stakeholders and the environment. As the proposed reforms 
do not seek to change the structure of section 172, they may ultimately raise 
more questions than provide solutions.  
C The Strategic Reporting Obligations  
Company disclosure regimes are typically structured hierarchically, with 
minimal requirements for the smallest private companies and the most onerous 
                                                 
72 For further discussion on s 172, see, eg, Andrew Keay, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value, the 
Reform of the Duties of Company Directors and the Corporate Objective’ [2006] Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 335; Peter Hood, ‘Directors’ Duties Under the 
Companies Act 2006: Clarity or Confusion?’ (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1. 
For broader discussion, see Andrew Keay and Hao Zhang, ‘An Analysis of Enlightened 
Shareholder Value in Light of Ex Post Opportunism and Incomplete Law’ (2011) 8 European 
Company and Financial Law Review 445; Andrew Keay, ‘The Duty to Promote the Success of 
the Company: Is It fit For Purpose?’ (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 1; Charlotte Villiers, 
‘Sustainable Companies: Barriers and Possibilities in UK Company Law’ (2015) 11 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 105.   
73 See, eg, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, The Social Responsibility of 
Corporations Report (December 2006) 111–2.  
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obligations placed on listed companies. This pattern is adopted in Chapter 4A 
of the Companies Act. All companies in the UK other than those categorised as 
‘small’ must provide a strategic report including a review of the company’s 
business and a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the 
company.74 Further analysis using key performance indicators may also be 
necessary.75 Listed companies are required to do more and must explain the 
factors that will affect the company prospectively and the company’s business 
model.76  
The Financial Reporting Council has published a detailed guide to assist 
companies with preparation of the strategic report.77 Nonetheless, there are no 
details in the Companies Act or elsewhere that discuss how companies should 
link the content provided in their strategic report to their compliance with 
section 172 and how they ought to explain the practical implications of the 
section 172 duty, including specific outcomes. While companies are required 
to provide explanatory disclosures on the secondary factors listed in section 
172(1)(a)-(f), the stated audience is limited to shareholders and the content and 
usefulness of these reports are challengeable. The open nature of section 172 
allows companies to interpret the requirement to have regard to the secondary 
matters either very narrowly or generously. In worst case scenarios, the 
commentary provided in the strategy reports may be procedural, highly generic, 
or at such a high level that its probative value is minimal.  
                                                 
74 Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 414C(2)–(3). Failure to provide the strategy report constitutes a 
criminal offence: s 414A(5)–(6). In 2014, the European Union enacted legislation requiring the 
provision of non-financial information: Art 6 Directive 2014/95/EU. For discussion on these 
reforms, see Gill North, ‘Company Reporting of Environmental, Social and Gender Matters: 
Limitations, Barriers and Changing Paradigms’ in Beate Sjåfjell and Irene Lynch Fannon (eds), 
Creating Corporate Sustainability: Gender as an Agent for Change (Cambridge University 
Press, 2018) 91. 
75 Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 414C (4)-(5). Where a company qualifies as medium-sized in 
relation to a financial year (see sections 465 to 467), the review for the year need not comply 
with the requirements of subsection (4) so far as they relate to non-financial information: s 
414C(6). 
76 Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 414C (7). Subsection 7 provides that in the case of a quoted 
company the strategic report must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
development, performance or position of the company’s business, include—(a) the main trends 
and factors likely to affect the future development, performance and position of the company’s 
business, and (b) information about—(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the 
company’s business on the environment), (ii) the company’s employees, and (iii) social, 
community and human rights issues, including information about any policies of the company 
in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies. 
77 Financial Reporting Council, Guidance on the Strategic Report (June 2014). 
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D Are the Disclosure and Engagement Governance 
Rules Effective?     
In financial markets without company disclosure regulation, boards would have 
the discretion to determine whether to disclose specific information to the 
market, whether to disclose information privately or publicly, the specific 
investors to whom information is disclosed, and when to disclose information. 
In voluntary disclosure settings, many listed company managers would likely 
provide public disclosures only when required for procedural purposes, or for 
operational or reputational reasons, such as the raising of new capital or to 
encourage higher security prices. Disclosure regulation that encourages or 
requires companies to publicly disclose material information is intended to 
result in more equitable and broader access to corporate information, more 
efficient markets, and more balanced reporting that encompasses disclosure of 
both positive and negative news.78 However, these regimes are effective only 
when they alter the private versus public disclosure incentive equations and 
when the perceived and actual levels of market and regulatory deterrence are 
sufficient to change behaviour.  
Under UK company law, corporate directors and managers can achieve similar 
outcomes to those that would naturally be achieved in markets without 
disclosure rules (at least over shorter periods) by restricting most of their 
communication (beyond release of the periodic financial statements) to private 
discussions with a core group of selected institutional investors. Company 
directors and senior executives continue to be strongly motivated to disclose 
the most detailed company information required for security valuation and 
corporate procedural purposes to only a limited number of selected investors, 
especially when the relevant information may adversely impact the value of the 
corporation or the directors’ personal standing or remuneration, or when the 
company is performing badly. Providing information in this manner allows 
companies to avoid public scrutiny, and to thereby limit their potential exposure 
to, and accountability for, poor business judgments and suboptimal 
performance. These processes also allow boards and executives to restrict the 
opportunities for dialogue afforded to other participants to low level forums, 
such as investor relations websites, surveys, and focus groups.79  
Regular private exchanges and close relationships between corporate boards 
and invited investors are prone to promote cronyism, executive access based on 
favours, uncritical acceptance of the company’s agenda, and a lack of probity 
                                                 
78 International Organization of Securities Commissions, Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation (June 2010) 3.  
79 North, above n 22, 207–10.  
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and accountability.80 Documented examples of these proclivities and practices 
abound. Empirical work confirms that most analysts and institutional investors 
are concerned with the need to stay in favour with companies to maintain 
private access to executives. Those who criticise or raise the alarm about 
managerial misconduct are commonly frozen out from company 
communication channels, particularly when companies are facing adverse 
conditions or financial pressures.81 Other bodies of empirical research that 
examine company reporting standards (including traditional financial reporting 
and corporate sustainability reporting) highlight issues with the overall quality 
of company reports released publicly.82 In particular, many studies find that 
companies delay, disguise or entirely fail to disclose ‘bad news’, even in 
jurisdictions with reporting regimes.83 Given this compelling evidence, 
recommendations that promote dialogue on governance matters predominantly 
at private meetings with core investors are open to serious challenge. Policy 
makers and regulators need to explain why they continue to permit, and even 
encourage, corporations to communicate primarily at closed meetings with 
selected investors.84 
                                                 
80 See, eg, Jill Fisch and Hillary Sale, ‘The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts’ (2003) 88 Iowa Law Review 1035; Donald C Langevoort, ‘Investment 
Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading’ (1990) 76 Virginia Law Review 1023, 1042.   
81 Fisch and Sale, above n 80, 1056; Bin Ke and Yong Yu, ‘The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings 
Forecasts on Analysts’ Access to Management and Survival’ (2006) 44 Journal of Accounting 
Research 965. For example, John Olsen, the Merrill Lynch energy sector analyst, was fired 
when he downgraded Enron’s stock. Similarly, analysts who criticised HIH Insurance prior to 
its collapse were blacklisted.   
82 For a summary outline, see North, above n 22, 207–10. See also John Peloza, ‘Using Corporate 
Social Responsibility as Insurance for Financial Performance’ (2006) 48 California 
Management Review 52; David Hess, ‘The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New 
Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development’ (2008) 18 Business Ethics 
Quarterly 447, 462–3; Itziar Castello and Josep M Lozano, ‘Searching for New Forms of 
Legitimacy through Corporate Responsibility Rhetoric’ (2011) 100 Journal of Business Ethics 
11; Breeda Comyns et al, ‘Sustainability Reporting: The Role of “Search”, “Experience” and 
“Credence” Information’ (2013) 37 Accounting Forum 231, 232–4, 241.   
83 For outlines of the scholarly empirical studies that confirm positive biases within financial 
reporting, see North, above n 22, 189–97. For references to empirical studies that find optimistic 
biases in corporate sustainability reporting, see Gill North, ‘Corporate Sustainability Practices 
and Regulation: Existing Frameworks and Best Practice Proposals’ in Jean du Plessis and Chee 
Keong Low (eds), Corporate Governance Codes for the 21st Century: International 
Perspectives and Critical Analyses (Springer Publishing, 2017) 145.   
84 Langevoort, above n 80, 1028, 1054. See also Paul Davies et al, ‘European Company Law 
Experts’ Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper “The EU Corporate Governance 
Framework”’ (22 July 2011) 1 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/ 
corporate-governance-framework/individual-replies/ecle_en.pdf>. 
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Effective corporate governance structures require careful checks and balances 
to prevent excessive and inappropriate business conduct from occurring, or to 
mitigate it. Important elements of these structures include capacity for 
independent scrutiny of decision making and mechanisms to hold corporations 
and their boards to account. Independent scrutiny of corporate boards 
encourages positive change in the behaviour of decisionmakers, and 
accountability mechanisms are necessary to enable the consequences of poor 
decisions to be brought to bear on the company.85 The need for public 
transparency, probity and accountability is especially critical when the relevant 
companies are large, and there are major asymmetries of power, information, 
and resources between the board and outsiders, and between the various classes 
of investors and stakeholders. When company boards and senior executives are 
directing disclosure and engagement processes and have undue control and 
discretion, the voices and responses of actors with the least market power, such 
as casual workers or persons who are negatively impacted by corporate activity 
in developing countries, are often ignored or drowned out.86 All investors and 
other persons significantly impacted and influenced by corporate activities need 
to be able to scrutinise and criticise companies, write independent research and 
commentary, and make well informed decisions without fear of losing access 
to high quality company information and meaningful engagement mechanisms.  
E Negligible Market and Legal Consequences 
Associated with Corporate Communication 
Structures 
Extensive interdisciplinary empirical studies suggest that well-structured 
company reporting regimes contribute significantly to improved governance, 
corporate, market and economic outcomes, and that these benefits are greater 
when the disclosure obligations are vigorously enforced. In summary, country-
specific and global empirical studies consistently find significant associations 
between superior corporate and national outcomes and one or more of the 
following variables: high disclosure standards, vigorous enforcement of 
securities laws, broad investor participation, protection of minority shareholder 
rights, and enhanced public trust.87  
Other broader studies find a positive relationship between long term corporate 
sustainability performance and superior commercial outcomes, with minimal 
                                                 
85 Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, ‘The Framework for Board Accountability in Corporate 
Governance’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies 252, 266–7. 
86 Hess, above n 82, 463–4. 
87 For summaries and analysis of these studies, see North, above n 22, 32–9; North, above n 83.  
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evidence to the contrary.88 One study links superior corporate social 
responsibility performance to superior stakeholder engagement and suggests 
that ‘stakeholder engagement based on mutual trust and cooperation reduces 
potential agency costs by pushing managers to adopt a long-term rather than a 
short-term orientation’.89 More broadly, empirical evidence suggests that 
corporate sustainability reporting regimes can result in real change to a 
company’s conduct and culture. Ioannou and Serafeim examined the effects of 
mandatory corporate sustainability reporting in 58 countries and found that the 
adoption of such reporting led to heightened managerial awareness of 
sustainability issues and additional company programmes focused on 
sustainable development and employee training. In these companies, corporate 
governance standards and ethical practices improved, the levels of bribery and 
corruption decreased, and managerial credibility was enhanced. All these 
positive benefits were more significant in countries with stronger law 
enforcement and independent assurance of the reports.90  
It is unsurprising that positive benefits identified in reporting studies are more 
significant in countries with stronger regulatory intervention and enforcement. 
Reporting rules need to be well monitored and enforced to demonstrate the 
likely consequences when companies fail to comply with the law and to 
continually emphasise the importance of public transparency and high-quality 
reporting. Yet most of the corporate law reforms that seek to enhance 
transparency via disclosure, to increase the accountability of corporate boards, 
and to provide a greater voice to affected persons, are occurring through 
changes to governance codes and cannot be legally enforced.91 Even when one 
shifts the focus to disclosure rules within the relevant exchange listing rules and 
                                                 
88 See, eg, Robert Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim, ‘Market Interest in Nonfinancial 
Information’ (2011) 23 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 113; Philipp Kruger, ‘Corporate 
Goodness and Shareholder Wealth’ (2015) 115 Journal of Financial Economics 304; Yan Qiu, 
Amama Shaukat and Rajesh Tharyan, ‘Environmental; and Social Disclosures: Link with 
Corporate Financial Performance’ (2016) 48 British Accounting Review 102; Marlene Plumlee 
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corporate statute, instances of enforcement of these rules outside of the United 
States are scarce.92  
In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority has fined listed companies for 
breaching the Disclosure and Transparency Rules that apply to listed 
companies. For example, Rio Tinto was fined approximately £27 million for 
failing to carry out an asset impairment test and recognise an impairment loss 
on the value of its mining assets in Mozambique.93 Nevertheless, the level and 
scope of public enforcement actions governing company disclosure and 
engagement matters in the UK are minimal. The author has been unable to find 
an example of enforcement of the rules dealing with the provision of 
commentary in company reports in the UK. Similarly, no evidence could be 
found of monitoring of the information exchanged during private briefings or 
enforcement of the ban on payments for direct access to executives by the 
Financial Conduct Authority. This lack of monitoring and enforcement of 
company disclosure law weakens the credibility and efficacy of these regimes.  
There are some positive corporate reporting and conduct trends and indicators, 
such as an increasing number of corporate signatories of the United Nations 
Compact Principles94 and expanded corporate reporting on sustainability 
matters. Growing numbers of private and public actors (including corporate 
leaders) are challenging orthodox corporate governance principles and 
standards, driven by a conflation of factors, including the emergence of 
corporate sustainability goals, responsible investment principles,95 and record 
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low levels of community trust in corporations.96 While these factors are 
prompting significant changes in corporate conduct and reporting standards, 
many investors and other stakeholders continue to question the overall quality 
of corporate disclosure and engagement structures and outcomes, and are 
demanding more fundamental changes.97  
The corporate sector in the UK is aware of the need for real change. Nearly a 
decade ago, the Institute of Directors indicated that: 
The role of business today is far more pervasive than ever before. ... The 
simplistic view that prevailed in the 1990s that business leaders need to focus 
exclusively on shareholder value as determined by the share price and that 
financial analysts are the best judge of business strategy simply cannot hold 
ground today. In a millennium survey 60% of those interviewed said they 
would punish companies that were not environmentally or socially 
responsible. This shows how social good has become a powerful competitive 
differentiator. Business run on true principles of transparency, equity, 
accountability, integrity and responsibility can make a difference that could 
give enormous pride to executives and provide the true incentive for driving 
the corporations.98  
This statement by the Institute of Directors neatly encapsulates many of the 
concerns that underpin the corporate governance reform agenda in the UK and 
elsewhere. The extent to which these concerns have been accepted within, and 
inculcated into, corporate culture, law, and outcomes a decade later remains 
open to question though. The recent governance reform debate and proposals 
in the UK suggest that the journey towards more responsible and inclusive 
corporations has a long way to run.     
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It is appropriate for policy makers to seek to strengthen the voice of 
stakeholders, but this ‘voice’ will only be meaningful if company boards 
engage in constructive dialogue and respond to the issues raised. Stakeholders 
currently have negligible rights and remedies under corporate law when 
companies fail to provide them with relevant information or refuse to engage 
in dialogue. These stakeholders must generally rely on the goodwill of 
corporates, or form coalitions with shareholders to utilise the legal mechanisms 
available to shareholders, such as shareholder-led resolutions or director re-
election processes.99  
VI CONCLUSION 
The Cadbury Report and OECD corporate governance principles place great 
emphasis on corporate disclosure and engagement as mechanisms to enhance 
governance, promote high levels of corporate transparency, probity and 
accountability, and to sustain public trust and confidence in corporations. 
Empirical evidence confirms that well-designed corporate disclosure 
frameworks can alter managerial incentives, power imbalances and 
informational asymmetries. Mandatory reporting structures can oblige a 
company to consider business activities and impacts that have not been 
considered previously and may motivate the directors and managers to better 
strategise and to act in ways that create improved long-term performance and a 
more sustainable business. The reporting processes assist by providing the 
information to company leadership that is necessary for it to track its progress 
towards specific performance goals.100 The reporting frameworks can also 
promote long term national interests and engender public trust by requiring high 
quality public disclosures and the establishment of forums and facilities that 
allow ongoing dialogue with a broad audience. Corporate disclosure regimes 
can be powerful tools to open companies to public scrutiny and to promote good 
conduct. When operating effectively, reporting structures enhance competitive 
drivers and establish a virtuous circle that consistently raises the standards of 
corporate governance and communication.  
It is much easier to espouse the importance of corporate openness, integrity and 
accountability than to consistently achieve these outcomes. As Brandies 
highlighted more than a century ago, large corporations and financial 
institutions often benefit commercially from opaque and poorly supervised 
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environments.101 The political nature of company disclosure regulation often 
leads to heavily compromised regulatory settings, and these tendencies are 
reflected in UK law. First, the efficacy of the integrated regulatory framework 
governing listed company communication is severely weakened by the 
extensive use of private communication structures. Provision E.1.1 encourages 
listed companies to discuss governance and strategic matters privately with core 
investors and this encouragement is consistent with a predominant focus on this 
form of corporate communication in the UK. From the perspective of company 
boards, their legal advisers, and those given private access to company 
leadership, the use of tiered corporate communication structures is rational and 
reasonable. Instances of non-compliance with the disclosure and engagement 
provisions within the UK Code are unlikely to be challenged by institutional 
shareholders with direct access to the board and executives, when these 
participants are concerned about the need to maintain this channel of 
information.   
Second, the incentives underpinning private communication structures are 
often poorly aligned with the broad objectives of governance and disclosure 
regimes. The existing legal frameworks generally serve the interests of 
corporate leaders and the largest institutional investors, and other shareholders 
and stakeholders are left with minimal market-based levers and legal rights and 
remedies. The periodic reporting regimes in the UK that require the provision 
of commentary within reports are open-ended and loosely framed, giving 
companies considerable scope to determine the regularity, form and specific 
content of information released publicly. Under the existing rules, listed 
companies can provide positively framed, highly generic, and short term 
focused commentary in the directors and strategic reports. When the most 
pertinent information and useful performance indicators are not provided, the 
capacity of minority shareholders and other stakeholders to obtain relevant and 
useful company information and engage in dialogue is either limited or non-
existent. And when the content of publicly available corporate reports and 
disclosures is merely an indistinct shadow of the information provided 
privately, the disclosure regimes can provide a convenient regulatory façade to 
legitimise the extensive private communication networks.  
Third, the corporate governance and disclosure structures are undermined by 
largely ineffective regulatory monitoring and enforcement. The UK Code 
operates largely within market parameters and cannot be legally enforced. In 
addition, the statutory and listing rule disclosure obligations are rarely enforced 
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by the Financial Conduct Authority, and when they are, these actions concern 
the rules governing the financial statements and notes. No formal actions appear 
to have been initiated by either the UK Financial Reporting Council or the 
Financial Conduct Authority concerning reported commentary.   
The extent to which the proposed governance reforms to the UK Code will 
strengthen the rights and remedies of stakeholders remains unclear given the 
hierarchical structure of section 172. The section 172 duty prioritises the 
interests of shareholders as a whole, and other factors are merely secondary 
considerations, including the fair treatment of shareholders, the likely long-
term consequences of decisions, the interests of the employees, and the impact 
of the company’s operations on the community and environment. The present 
structure of section 172 will limit the potential benefits of the reforms that seek 
to strengthen the voice of other stakeholders and improve disclosure on 
environmental and social matters.  
To its credit, the Institute of Directors in the UK recognises that businesses 
should be driven by the principles of transparency, equity, accountability, 
integrity and responsibility. This organisation also acknowledges that it is no 
longer appropriate for companies to focus exclusively on shareholder value 
because companies are increasingly assessed by the community for their 
environmental and social responsibilities. The aims of the proposed reforms to 
the UK Code reflect these aspirations, but the devil will be in the detail and the 
key question is whether the final reforms will have real teeth and impact. The 
article encourages policy makers and others engaged in the corporate 
governance reform processes in the UK to respond seriously to the mounting 
demands for companies to do more to reflect their responsibilities to employees, 
customers and society, and to give stakeholders a greater voice in corporate 
boardrooms and beyond. The law governing listed company communication 
requires substantive reform, including a refocus on public communication 
structures to ensure that corporations are transparent, accountable, probative, 
inclusive and sustainable over the long term. Otherwise, there is a significant 
risk that the final reforms will constitute mere tinkering and will suffer from 
the same deficiencies as the existing corporate communication processes and 
rules; namely open-ended obligations that are unlikely to result in any 
significant market or legal responses or consequences, even when the quality 
of the public disclosure and engagement processes of companies is tokenistic.    
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POSTSCRIPT 
A revised version of the Corporate Governance Code in the UK was introduced 
in July 2018.102 The revisions that have been made to the Code are significant 
and include important structural, cultural and directional shifts. Commentary 
on reporting has been relocated from the main sections of the Code into the 
introduction. The principles on relations with shareholders are then merged 
within an overarching first principle (Principle A) entitled ‘Board Leadership 
and Company Purpose’. Provision one of this initial principle recommends that 
the board should assess the basis on which the company generates and preserves 
value over the long term and explain this in the annual report.103 More 
specifically, boards are asked to report on the consideration and management 
of opportunities and risks, the sustainability of the company’s business model, 
and the strategic contribution of its governance.104 This provision is well framed 
and closely aligns with emerging global corporate developments and thinking.  
Provision two of the Principle A recommends that boards should assess and 
monitor the culture of the company and report on relevant activities and actions. 
This reporting includes an explanation of the company’s dealings with its 
workforce.105 Although discussion on the culture of a company within 
regulatory spheres is highly contested, corporate reporting on employee related 
matters in annual reports is already the norm in developed countries, especially 
by larger companies.  
Provision three of Principle A retains the recommendation that the chair should 
seek regular engagement with major shareholders.106 Provision five of Principle 
A encompasses the proposed reforms regarding communication with other key 
stakeholders.107 Boards are asked to describe in the annual report how the 
interests of these stakeholders, and the other matters included in section 172, 
have been considered in discussions and decision making. Importantly, the 
predominant focus of this provision is the workforce. Boards are given three 
methods that can be used to engage with employees: 1) a director appointed 
from the workforce; 2) a formal workforce advisory panel; and 3) a designated 
non-executive director. Boards may use one or more of these three methods or 
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may use other approaches provided they explain why the alternative 
arrangements are effective.  
The Provision three requirements are sound and largely uncontroversial. The 
encompassed reporting and engagement obligations are open ended and require 
minimal response if the primary aim is to merely ensure compliance. Most 
communication between a company and the outside world will still occur at 
private forums with institutional investors. Boards can still determine how to 
engage with employees and other stakeholders, and the extent of this 
engagement. Moreover, boards can still decide the form and content of strategic 
and other forms of reporting.                 
